#### UNITEDSTATESOFAMERICA FEDERALENERGYREGULATORYCOMMISSION

RuleRegardingCriticalEnergy	)	
InfrastructureInformationPolicy,	)	DocketNo.RM02 -4-000
StatementontheTreatmentof	)	
PreviouslyPublicDocuments	)	

# COMMENTSOFTHE PUBLICUTILITIES COMMISSIONOFOHIO, THEOKLAHOMACORPORATION COMMISSION, AND THEMICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, and the Michigan Public Service Commission ("state commissions") respectfully files this response to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's ("Commission" or "FERC") Notice of Inquiry (NOI) regarding the public availability of critical energy in frastructure information (CEII).

InlightoftheeventsofSeptember11,2001,newmeasuresmustbetakentoguard criticalenergyinfrastructureinformationfrommisuse.Atthesametime,becausesuchdatahas generallybeenpubliclyavailable,andoftenreliedonbyregulators,ut ilitiesandcitizensin regulatoryproceedings,thequestionsraisedbytheCommission'sNOIarenovelanddifficult. ThestatecommissionssharetheCommission'sinterestinassuringthatthequestionsraisedby theNOIaresquarelyaddressedandcorrec tlyanswered,sothatanyCEIIlimitationsbeonfirm legalandpracticalfooting,withfullanddueregardforthecentralroleofpublicparticipationin utilityregulatoryproceedings.WethereforeapplaudtheCommissionforitsgoodfaitheffortto

seekpubliccommentonthesequestions.Inlightoftheobviousimportanceofthismattertoall ofus,andthecommonalityofthequestionsraisedbytheCommissionwiththosethatarebeing addressedbyotherfederalandstatepublicagencies,thestatec ommissionsrespectfullysuggest thatinrespondingtopubliccommentsandformulatingpolicytheCommissionmaywishto consultwiththeOfficeofHomelandSecurityandconsiderwhethernewlegislationisneededto effectuatesomeofwhattheNOIproposes. Thereneedstobeacohesiveapproachtosolving theseveryseriousmatters.

Our comments below cover three main topics. First, weaddress the Commission's request for comments on the applicability of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemptions for the property of the property o $CEII (NOI, Topic 6) and comment generally on the Commission's statutory authority for the {\tt CEII} (NOI, {\tt Topic 6}) and {\tt CEII} ({\tt NOI}, {\tt Topic 6}) and {\tt Topic 6}) an$  $proposal soutlined in the NOI. As explained below, the rear esignificant questions about the {\tt the rear esignificant} and {$ applicabilityoftheexemptions.OurdiscussionoftheFOIAexemptionsan dthelegalbasisfor the Commission's proposed course of actionals ocomments on the use of non--disclosure Second, we comment on the potential ramifications of the agreements(NOI,topic5). Commission'sproposalsonstatepublicutilitycommissions(add ressedinpartinNOI, Topic6). Specifically, we explain our concern that the Commission's proposed path of dealing with CEII mayhaveramificationsfor:(1)statecommissionabilitytoobtaininformationthatisroutinely required;(2)statecommission abilitytouseinformationinpublicproceedings;and(3)the obligationsofstatecommissionstaffandofficialswhohandleCEIItodosoinwaysthatdonot violateyet -to-bespecifiedgoverningrulesorprinciples. Third, we provide several comments and questions that the Commission will need to address in defining CEII (NOI, Topic 2).

The comments below were prepared without access to the Commission's non -public -public

appendix.Wenotethatthetimeperiodforrequestsforaccesstothenon -publicappendi xwas significantlyshorterthanthetimeperiodforfilingcomments.

#### I. StatutoryImpedimentstotheCommission'sProposal 1

#### A.FederalInformationLaw:BackgroundRelevanttoCEII

TheFederalgovernmentisobligedtomakepublicallinforma tionthatisnotexempt from disclosure under the Freedomof Information Act, 5U.S.C. sec. 552. 2"Records" (including electronic records) possessed by Federal "agencies" must, upon written request by any "person" pursuant to agency FOIA rules, be made available to any requestor unless they fall under one (or more) of nine exemptions. The statute excludes federal agencies from the definition of "persons" but state agencies can make FOIA requests. 3

 $Once in formation is released under FOIA it is available to all requestors; the government cannot place restrictions on reuse of the information. \\ ^4A requestor may republish the information on a website, for example. Moreover, the determination to release information cannot depend on the identity of the requestor . \\$ 

 $<sup>^{1}\</sup> Our\ comments in this part address NOI, topic 6, Applicability of FOIAExemptions; topic 5, Non-disclosure Agreements; and comment generally on the Commission's authority topur sue the policies identified in the NOI.$ 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>TheDepartmentofJusticepublishesadet ailedstandardguidetoFOIAproceduresand caselaw. <u>See</u>*FreedomofInformationActGuide* (May2000),availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foi-act.htm.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See, e.g., Texasv.ICC ,935F.2d728(5 <sup>th</sup>Cir.1991).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Itappearsthattheonlyreuserestricti onsplacedondocumentsreleasedunderFOIAare thoserelatingtopotentialcopyrightissues (*i.e.*,notificationthatreusemayposecopyright paymentobligations).

# B. The NOI's Presumption That CEII Can Largely Be Withheld Under Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Exemptions Merits Careful Scrutiny

The NOIstates, at 22, that the Commission's proposed approach is "premised on the belief that CEII is exempt from a isclosure under the Freedomof Information Act." This premise is key because, as the Commission explains, id., disclosure to anyone under FOIA requires disclosure to all requestors. However, the kinds of documents at issue have hither to been available under FOIA, and it is not obvious that more than a fraction of CEII can be readily exempted under FOIA.

Asathresholdmatter,theNoticedoesnotsuggestthattheCEIIatissueissubjectto

"nationalsecurity"exemption.WhiletheCommissiondoesnotexpl ainwhyitdoesnotinvoke

theexemption,theremaybeseveralbasesfortheomission.First,ofcourse,exemptiononehas

notpreviouslybeeninvokedinregardtothedocuments;however,thisalsocanbesaidregarding

theFOIAexemptionsonwhichtheC ommissiondoesproposetorely.Second,thereisno

precedentfor"classifying"informationthatisproducedbytheprivateindividuals( e.g.,utilities)

whodonototherwisehaveaccesstogovernmentgeneratedclassifiedinformation.

The Commission sugg ests (at 23 - 24) that FOIA exemptions 2,4, and 7 may be employed to prevent dissemination of CEII. However, in spection of these exemptions indicates that there may be problems shoehorning CEII into the statutory language and traditional framework of these three exemptions.

**Exemption2:** Exemption2protectsfromdisclosuredocuments"relatedsolelytothe

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Therehasbeendebateastowhether "atomicsecrets" deduced by private citizens with no access to classified data (such as a college physics student) may be classified. However, there appears to be no precedent (at least no public precedent) for the classification of privately

internalpersonnelrulesandpractices[suchasIRSenforcementpractices]ofanagency."Infact, followingSeptember11,thisexemptionisnowbeingu sedbyagenciestoexempt"threat assessments"or"vulnerability"studiestheymayperformtoassesspossibleinternalriskstotheir ownagenciesandFederalfacilities.

However,theCommission'spositionraisesnovelquestions:thestatutorylanguage ,as justquoted,referstomatters"internal"tothegovernment("ofanagency");weareawareofno precedentforapplyingthisexemptiontoinformationdevelopedbytheprivatesectorandwhich relatestovulnerabilityoftheprivatesector.

**Exemption4**: Exemption4protects "tradesecrets and financial or commercial information obtained from a person [that is ] privileged or confidential."

The proposed use of Exemption 4 also raises novel questions. By definition, the information at issue has not hither to be enviewed as commercially sensitive -- utility providers of the information have not previously sought to invoke this exemption and, indeed, may not be doing so eventoday. The arguably the events of September 11 present changed circumstances that may render previously public information commercially sensitive (e.g., potential terrorist conduct may damage abusiness). However, this proposition is untested, and it is not clear that this logic is even proposed by the FERCNotice.

 $produced in formation that, like FERC data produced by utilities, \\ has never been classified.$ 

 $<sup>^{6} \</sup>underline{See} the website of the National Archives, which indicates it is using the exemption regarding agency vulnerability studies.$ 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>TheNOI,at9,explainsthatingrantingWillistonBasin'srequesttotreatportionsof Williston's tariffsheetsasconfidential,ittookintoaccountthatcustomersorprospective customerswillbeabletoobtainthemapdirectlyfromthepipelinecompany.

**Exemption7**: Exemption7 appliesto "recordsorinformation compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information could reasonably be expected to end anger the life or physical safety of any individual."

Here, onceagain, FERC's proposed use of an exemption raises novel questions. While FERC calls for utility comment on the matter, 8 the information at issue has not been previously protected under this exemption. It would seem necessary to argue, again, tha the events of September 11 somehow render previously public information subject to the exemption. Perhaps the Commission could conclude that all CEII information is now deemed to be placed in a law enforcement file, and, ipsofacto, subject to exemption 7; however such a method of invoking the exemption raises questions of public policy since such an assertion could substantially expand the previous application of this exemption.

In sum, it is possible that, by invoking September 11 concerns, a fair a mode of CEII in the might qualify for an exemption under FOIA, but this would be a basic departure from the historic treatment of the information (and of the construction of the FOIA exemptions). Moreover, even if a vailable, the exemptions may only covera portion of information at issue. Therefore, it is respectfully requested that FERC, in consultation with the Office of Homeland Security, provide careful consideration of the extent to which existing FOIA exemptions can reasonably be applied to CEII, and the possibility that a further and new exemption may be needed to treat CEII. After

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>TheFERCNotice,at24,asks:

<sup>&</sup>quot;WhatkindsofdocumentscontainingCEIIarecompiledbythe Commissionforlawenforcementpurposesthatcouldreasonably

all, this will affect all of us, both in publics a fety and job performance.

C. TheCommission'sProposaltoMakeDocumentsAvailableonaNeedto
KnowBasisMayCallforANew ClassofProtectedDocumentsForWhich
ThereisNoProvisionUnderCurrentLaw

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The NOI explains that to release documents on a need to know basis, it must release them outside of FOIA (because release under FOIA would require release to the publication ge). However, the redoes not appear to be any current law that would permit such selective release. Presumably, the Commission must point to some specific statutory authorization for selective release in light of the Freedom of Information Act's presumpt ion that all federal agency records must be disclosed unless FOIA itself provides for an exception to the disclosure requirement. See DOJF reedom of Information Act Guide, supra.

Nationalsecuritylaws, assummarized above, dopermitselective release of documents (to those who have "clearances"). However, the NOI does not propose to invoke the selaws.

Moreover, nationalsecurity secrecy laws apply to document sgenerated by the government (or its contractors and consultants), and to individuals who are under restrictive agreements. The document satissue in the Notice are not produced by the government or contractor officials under security restrictions; nor (to the extent that they have been publicly available) do they likely embody classified data.

 $In \ sum, the statutory basis for the proposed selective release of CEII is uncertain and may$ 

beexpectedtoendangerthelifeorphysicalsafetyofindividuals?"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>TheNoticestates,at16(footnoteomitted),that:"[a]tpresent,theCommissionis consideringanapproachthatwouldstriv etoprocessmostrequestsforCEIIoutsideoftheFOIA process."

besubjecttolegalchallenge. <sup>10</sup>ThestatecommissionssharewiththeCommissionaspecial interestinassuringthatFERC'snewpolicythoroughlyconsiderwhetherexis tinglegalregimes forprovidingdocumentsonarestrictedbasisaresufficienttocoverCEIIneeds,and,ifnot,what additionalrulesorlawsmaybeneeded.

D. FERC'sProposaltoLimitDisclosuresonaNeed -to-KnowBasis RequiresNondisclosureAgreeme ntsThatMayRaiseQuestionsof LawfulnessandPracticabilityThatShouldBeAddressedInAdvance

Thelegalbasis and the procedures the Commission will utilize for implementing the non disclosure agreements that will be required if CEII is to be disclose donase lective basis are unclear. As just noted, our federal laws provide for selective disclosure of national security information. In addition, as the NOI points out, they provide for selective disclosure of documents to parties to judicial or administrative proceedings ("protective or ders").

However, the NOI does not suggest that the documents will be governed by existing national security regulations, and protective orders have been employed only inconnection with proceedings and then to parties to the proceeding.

Inshort,iftheFERCdoesproposetolimitdisclosureonaneedtoknowbasis,thenit alsomayneedtodevelopanewschemeforbindingrecipientsofthedatatonondisclosure. This, inturn, suggeststheneedtopolicenondisclosureag reements, and to have real sanctions for their

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> FOIAexemption3allowsthewithholdingofinformationprohibitedfromdisclosure byanotherstatute.ItmightbearguedthattheFederalPowerorNaturalGasActsprovideabasis forwi thholdinginformationunderthisexemption.However,suchargumenthasnotpreviously beenmadeandthecriteriacontainedinexemption3renderitssuccessdoubtful.Specifically,the exemptionrequiresthatthestatutoryprovisionsprecludingdisclosur emust"(A)requirethatthe mattersbewithheldfromthepublicinsuchamannerastoleavenodiscretionontheissue,or (B)establishparticularcriteriaforwithholdingorrefertoparticulartypesofdocumentstobe withheld." See5U.S.C.sec.552( b)(3).

violations.If,astheNOIsuggests,theCommissionisnotseekingtobaraccesstomembersof thepublicatlarge,nondisclosureandenforcementrequiresconsiderablethought.

The Commission, in consultation with the Office of Homeland Security, should consider and explain how such agreements could be crafted and policed. For example:

- (1) WouldtheCommissionrequiresignedagreementsasaconditionfor receiptofinformation?
- (2)Howwouldthecondi tionsbepoliced --particularlyinregardtothosewho intendtoviolatethem?Wouldenforcementrelyonanhonorsystem?
  Whatkindofinvestigationwouldbeundertaken,andbywhom,if,for example,apressreportappearedconcerningadocumentreleased by FERConaselectivebasis?
- (3) Whatkindsofsanctionswouldbeimposedforviolations?
- (4) WouldFERCproposetobarprivateutilitiesfromdisclosingthe informationontheirownvolition?Ifso,howcouldthisbeenforced (assumingitwerelegal)?Ifno t,wouldprivateutilitiesusethebarasa broadtooltoavoiddisclosureofinformationthatthepublicplainlyhasa needtoknow?Whowouldpolicethis?

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## II. TheFERCNoticeRaisesSpecialQuestionsforStateCommissions

The NOI raises special questions for state publicutility commissions, both as users of information and providers of information. Below we note some of the questions of significance to the state commissions that the Commission will need to consider in adopting a CEII policy.

# A. The Proposal Could Affect the Legitimate Need of State Commissions for Access to Utility Information

Theinformationatissueistherawmaterial from which state publicutility commissions (PUC) conductday -to-dayanalysis, inquiries, and proceedings . Thus, it is crucial that the

 $<sup>^{11}\</sup> This part of our comments addresses NOIT opic 3, "Requester's Status," and provides$ 

 $Commission fully explore the ramifications for its treatment of CEII on state commission access \\to information. The Commission will need to examine the following types of questions \\regarding PUC access to information:$ 

(1) WillPUCsbeentitledtoallCEIIpossessedbytheCommission,atleast uponreasonableassertionofneed?

TheNOIstates,at17 -18,thatbecausePUCsarepublicagencies,FERCmayprovide themCEIIdatawithouttriggeringgeneralpublicavailability.Howe ver,FERCnotesthatthis arrangementmayraise *exparte* problemswherethePUCsreceivesuchdatatotheexclusionof otherinterestedparties.

- (2) What,ifany,preemptiveeffectwilltheCommission'sCEIIpolicyhaveon PUCs?
  - (a) DoesFERCintendthat itsdefinitionofCEII,whateveritmaybe, dictatesthestatedefinition?
  - (b) Willstatesthemselvesbeobligedtoamendtheirowndisclosure rulesandlawstocomportwithCEIIrequirements?
  - (c) If so, on what legal authority does the Commission base this view?

DoestheCommissionagreethatstatesshouldcontinuetobeentitledto directlyaccessCEIIfromutilitiessubjecttotheirjurisdiction?() Whatwillhappenwhen/ifautilityinvokesaCEIIclaimasabasisfor restrictingstate PUCaccess?Whogetstodecidethisclaim,thePUCor theFERC?

- (3)AssumingPUCscancontinuetorequiredatafromjurisdictionalutilitiesas theyhavepreviously, will states have access to relevant data which may not be possessed by jurisdiction alentities (e.g., data related to regional grids that extend beyond a state's border)?
- B. StateCommissionUseofCEIIDatainPUCProceedingsorOther AppropriateFora( <u>e.g.</u>,Legislatures)

additional comment on informationalissues of importance to state regulators.

- (1) DoestheCommissionproposethatitsruleswillgovernstateP UCuseof CEIIdata?
  - (a) If so, what is the legal basis for this view?
  - (b) DoesitmatterwherethePUCgotthedatafrom?Doesitmatterif theutilityisgenerallymakingthedataavailable?
- (2) HowwillCommissionrulesinteractwithstatepublic recordslaws?
- (3) If there is reasonable disagreement about PUC use of documents, who gets to determine the use? Must the PUC report to the Commission?

#### C. PUCCompliancewithNondisclosureRequirements

- (1) Whatpracticalchangeswillberequiredin thestorageandmanagementof recordsatthePUC?( <u>E.g.</u>,Willtherebearequirementthatdocumentsbe reviewedandCEIIdocumentssegregated,orstamped?)
- (2) Whatrequirements will be placed on staff who handle CEII data?

## ${\bf III.} \quad {\bf The Definition of Critical E} \quad {\bf nergy Infrastructure Information} \quad ^{12}$

The NOI, at 14 -15, seeks comment on the CEII status of certain types of information.

The "non-public appendix" apparently identifies categories of information that likely meritth is status. As noted above, we have not reviewed the non-public appendix in light of the early deadline for requesting access to the appendix. As a result, below we provide a brieflist of factors, in the form of three questions, which the Commissions hould consider in determining what constitutes CEII for which public access may be restricted:

(1) Whatkindsofinformationwillremainpubliclyavailablewhetherornot the Commission limits its availability?

For example, much information may already be available on the webonnong overnmental

sitesthatarebeyondCommissionjurisdiction.Otherinformation,suchasplantlocation,is relativelyaccessiblebyphysicalreview.Howshouldsuchinformationbehandled?

(2) Whathaveotheragencies done in regard to information that is normally considered to be an essential part of a public review process but, in some cases, cannot be broadly disclosed?

Forexample,theNationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct,42U.S.C.sec.4321 etseq (NEPA) doesprovidefortheconductofclassifiedenvironmentalimpacts tatements.

(3) Whatkindsofdisclosuresarepotentiallydangerouswhenlocatedon websites,butoflessdangeriflimitedtopublicrecordsroomdisclosure?

The Environmental Protection Agency, for example, currently provides certain data only at public records rooms, and then may limit copies and/or numbers of requests.

#### Conclusion

WecommendtheCommissionforitsefforttoaddressimportantissuesofenergy security. The NOI raises complex questions for which there appears to be little precedent. Appropriate and cohesivere solution will require very careful scrutiny and deliberation, due to the far-reaching implications to publics a fety and state and federal agency performance. Given the common a lity of the issues raised by the NOI with those facing oth eragencies, and the difficult legal and practical questions that may be raised by restrictions on CEII, the Commission should consult with the Office of Homeland Security in responding to comments, and formulating its further proposal. In addition, depen ding on the results of the Commission's analysis of current Freedom of Information Actexemptions and existing protocol for limiting disclosures on a need to know basis, the Commission may wish to identify is sues which would be nefit from legislative

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>Thispart commentsonNOItopic2,regardingthedefinitionofCEII.

attention and direction. In any event, if the Commission prefers to move forward, there is a need to fleshout and address questions regarding the effect of the Commission's proposal on state commissions beyond those questions raised in the NOI.

#### Respectfullysu bmitted,

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